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INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFLICT
IN THE REGULATION OF BLOCKBUSTING
ACTIVITIES
In Summer v. Township of Teaneck, a licensed real estate broker
whose business consisted in large part of making uninvited solicita-
tions for real estate listings sought to have the New Jersey Supreme
Court declare void a municipal ordinance designed to prevent "block-
busting."2 The township adopted the ordinance under the authority
of a statutes granting municipal corporations power to enact ordi-
nances "not contrary" to the laws or constitutions of the United States
or New Jersey. It requires "any person who receives or expects to re-
ceive pecuniary gain from the sale of real property"4 and who intends
to conduct uninvited solicitations for the purpose of getting real estate
listings or to speak to owners about real estate transactions to file a
form with the township clerk between 10 and 30 days before the solicit-
ing is to take place. The form contains "a listing of the particular
block or blocks in the Township which the person intends to canvass,
as well as the date or dates of canvass."s
The Supreme Court of New Jersey upheld the validity of the ordi-
nance, notwithstanding an alleged conflict with a rule of the state Real
Estate Commission prohibiting conduct defined as blockbusting.0 The
1. 53 N.J. 548, 251 A.2d 761 (1968).
2. The court defined "blockbusting" as "the practice of inducing owners of
property to sell because of the actual or rumored advent into the neighborhood
of a member of a racial, religious, or ethnic group." Id. at 551, 251 A.2d at 762.
3. N.J. REv. STAT. § 40:48-2 (Supp. 1969).
4. Township of Teaneck, N.J., Ord. No. 1274, in Brief and Appendix of
Defendant-Appellant at 2a.
5. Brief and Appendix for Defendant-Appellant at 2a. The term "canvass"
was defined in the ordinance to include "door to door soliciting or soliciting by
the use of circulars, visitations, or any other means where the canvasser, or his
employer has not been invited or requested by the owner ... to obtain a listing
of real property or to confer with the owner regarding a real estate transaction."
6. "Rule No. 26. BLOCK BUSTING
"No broker or salesman shall affirmatively solicit the sale, lease, or the list-
ing for sale or lease, of residential property on the grounds of alleged change of
value due to the presence or prospective entry into the neighborhood of a person
or persons of another race, religion, or ethnic origin nor shall distribute, or cause
to be distributed, material or make statements designed to induce a residential
property owner to sell or lease his property due to such change in the neighbor-
hood." 53 N.J. at 555 & n. 1, 251 A.2d at 765 & n. 1.
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Commission had promulgated its rule in exercise of its power to license
real estate brokers and to define permissible broker conduct.7
New Jersey law regarding conflicts between state statutes and
municipal ordinances appears to be that if the legislature has "pre-
empted" a particular field, no conflicting ordinance may stand." Fur-
thermore, even if the legislature has not spoken, no municipality may
regulate a subject "inherently" in need of uniform, statewide control.9
Only where the field has not been preempted and the subject matter
is one of local concern is an ordinance valid. 0 The issues on which the
case turned were: (1) whether the creation of the Real Estate Com-
mission to license and regulate brokers indicated legislative intent to
preempt the field of blockbusting control, and (2) whether block-
busting is a subject over which municipal legislation is powerless
because of a need for statewide uniformity. In an opinion by Chief
Justice Weintraub, the court answered both questions negatively.
The Commission's rule had been promulgated under general
authority in the real estate statute "to make, prescribe, and enforce
any and all rules and regulations for the conduct of the real estate
brokerage business .... "- The court reasoned that this rule did not
mean that other levels of government cannot "move against the same
misconduct." 12 In other words, the rule should not be regarded as an
immunity from all forms of regulation and prosecution for those who
hold licenses from the Commission. Citing the municipality's general
authority to legislate,'1 3 and impressed with the New Jersey constitu-
tional provision requiring liberal construction of statutes in favor of
municipalities,4 the court held that the creation of the Real Estate
Commission did not preempt the field. And since "blockbusting
depends very much on the local scene and varies accordingly.
this subject did not require uniform state action. 6
7. 53 N.J. at 555, 251 A.2d at 765.
8. See, e.g., Kennedy v. City of Newark, 29 N.J. 178, 148 A.2d 473 (1959).
9. See, e.g., In re Public Service Electric & Gas Co., 35 N.J. 358, 173 A.2d
233 (1961).
10. For a more detailed examination of the field of municipal-state conflicts,
see Note, 72 HAtv. L. REv. 737 (1969).
11. N.J. REv. STAT. § 45:15-17 (Supp. 1969).
12. 53 N.J. at 555, 251 A.2d at 765.
13. N.J. REv. STAT. § 40:48-2 (Supp. 1969).
14. N.J. CoNsT., art. IV, § 7, 11 (1947).
15. 53 N.J. at 553, 251 A.2d at 764.
16. In the past, when testing the appropriateness of a given municipal ordi-
nance, the court looked for one of two alternative elements: (1) the effect of
the ordinance outside the municipality; or (2) evidence revealing a need for
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In reaching these conclusions, the court did not discuss the earlier
case of State v. Stockllr in which a county court specifically held that
by its delegation of power to the Real Estate Commission "[t]he state
has preempted the field to the exclusion of municipal exercise of
power or regulation or licensing in this field." s In Stockl, a borough
ordinance required any canvasser or solicitor first to obtain a munici-
pal license and to wear an identifying badge during the time that he
engaged in soliciting. The ordinance also provided for revocation of
the license and prosecution in the event that the canvasser acted irre-
sponsibly or unlawfully. It is evident that the ordinance was primarily
intended to be a method of controlling the entry of strangers into the
community to engage in unscrupulous or criminal activity through
soliciting; it was not intended to regulate real estate brokers alone.10
But the Stockl court held that since the ordinance did apply to brokers
it was in conflict with the statute which created the Real Estate Com-
mission. Since the statute empowering municipalities to license certain
professions20 specifically provides that nothing in it should be con-
strued to allow a municipality to regulate any person holding a state
license, the court found that the legislature had preempted the field.
The ordinance in Stockl required those who wished to engage in
soliciting to obtain a municipal license. In that respect it conflicted
more directly with the state licensing statute than did the Summer
ordinance, which provided only that would-be solicitors give the city
notice of an intention to solicit. On the other hand, the Stockl ordi-
nance was one of general application, but the Teaneck provision con-
cerned real estate brokers exclusively.
The apparent inconsistency in the two cases may be explained by
interpreting the Summer opinion as holding that it is the Commis-
statewide control. But if this is the court's test, it may become impossible to up-
hold any ordinance, since it is hard to imagine any subject which cannot, in
some way, affect statewide concerns. 72 HARv. L. REv., supra note 10, at 742.
The court in Summer seemed to abandon any search for the first alternative and,
instead, relied solely on the second, while implying that the use of the second
had been expanded far beyond its original application, which was to matters like
"wills or titles to real property." 53 N.J. at 552, 251 A.2d at 763. By adopting as
its sole test an evaluation of the need for statewide control, the court seems to
adhere to the original purpose of the uniformity doctrine. It also seems to give the
proper effect to the constitutional provision which encourages upholding municipal
enactments.
17. State v. Stockl, 85 N.J. Super. 591, 205 A.2d 478 (Super. Ct. 1964)
18. Id. at 599, 205 A.2d at 483.
19. Id. at 594, 205 A.2d at 480.
20. N.J. Rzv. STAT. § 40:52-1 (Supp. 1969).
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sion's responsibility to license brokers-thus the decision invalidating
the Stockl licensure ordinance-but that business operations within the
municipalities are primarily the concern of the cities themselves. Yet
this reading of the case is difficult to support. The technique the
municipality uses should not be determinative. There is no practical
difference between licensing a broker and then prosecuting him for
engaging in blockbusting, and requiring notice of intent to solicit
and then prosecuting for the same activity.
The cases also may be distinguished by the fact that Stockl was
decided by a county court and Summer by the highest court of the
state. Yet this explanation fails to justify the court's disregard of the
broad language of the Stockl opinion. Instead, Summer may have
overruled the Stockl holding, and at the very least the latter case has
not received a sympathetic reading by the New Jersey Supreme Court.
These two cases demonstrate the confusion attendant upon conflicts
between state statutes and municipal ordinances, especially with regard
to blockbusting. The problem is to find the appropriate governmental
level of regulation of activities which dearly have racial dimensions.
The Federal Fair Housing Act of 1968,21 and its prohibition of block-
busting,2 do not resolve the problem, because that statute only sug-
gests a third possible governmental agency with an interest in con-
trolling such activity. Application of this federal law, furthermore,
increases the danger of multiple prosecution by the various govern-
mental agencies at the local, state and federal levels. Finally, the
character of the municipal regulations themselves may be difficult to
identify because prosecution or licensure at the local level may amount
in practice to a veiled means of accomplishing racial exclusion.
What is needed to answer the question of the proper limits on
municipal power is a careful legislative determination, not a judicial
one. Unfortunately, conflicting political pressures and difficulties in
in defining the activity make state legislative limits on municipal
power in this area very difficult to conceive. We may thus look for
continuing litigation over local ordinances that attempt to deal with
these problems.
J. Stuart Showalter
21. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3601 et seq. (1969).
22. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3604(e) (1969).
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